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THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

BY THE HON. JOHN A. T. HULL.

THIS Government is so situated as to make a large standing army unnecessary. The two oceans separate us from the great nations of the world. Canada, on our north, would make a good base for England to operate against us, but could not as an independent government give us serious trouble. Mexico and other American governments on our south are so overshadowed by the Greater Republic as to be no menace to our security. Under less favorable circumstances, this Government would be compelled to maintain an army of several hundred thousand men, as well as keep a large reserve ready for the second fighting line.

But the fact that our immediate danger is small is no reason for the entire indifference with which our army has been treated since the close of the Civil War. It costs very little more to have an army organized properly to meet the conditions of modern warfare than it does to keep up an obsolete system. The average American is so full of patriotic pride that he cannot conceive of a condition which would make the American soldier, regular or volunteer, inferior to any other soldier on earth. Our wars in the past have largely justified this estimate. But since our own Civil War, all armies have been organized on a new basis. When that war was fought, we had an organization equal to

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any that could be brought against us—we were on an equality with any possible foe. The rapid-fire, long-range rifle came in after our war had been fought to a successful conclusion. With new and improved arms, both artillery and musketry, came a change in organization. The old single battalion, with close order formation, gave way in all the armies of Europe to the three battalion and extended order formation. In the Civil War, with our muzzle-loading, short-range guns, we could get into close proximity to the enemy before being in danger; and touching elbows, two ranks deep, the troops on either side could make effective charge and counter charge. If any army should go into action with this old formation to-day, the loss of life would be appalling. An army attempting it would be destroyed before it could inflict any damage on the opposing force.

Before the bill providing for the reorganization of the army was passed last April, the United States had by law, in the event of our army's confronting an enemy, hampered it by an obsolete organization. The War Department, wiser than Congress, had adopted a modern organization and, so far as possible, drilled our small regular army in modern tactics. This was done in violation of law. But, in case of war, all regiments would have been organized in ten companies, single battalion formation, just as in the Civil War. When the bill was first submitted early in April, 1898—cast on the line of the three battalion formation, but giving only two majors to an infantry regiment, with provisions too economical for an organization of any great effectiveness—it aroused such a storm of indignation in and out of Congress as to cause the overwhelming defeat of the measure. We were then within a few days of actual war, but so-called leaders in the House of Representatives declared that there would be no war, and that, if there should be, we must depend on the citizen soldiery. No increase of the army would be tolerated, and formation on modern lines was impossible without increase or reduction of regiments. The organized militia of the States saw in this moderate measure an attempt to keep them from active service, and brought all their powerful influence to bear to prevent a proper organization of the army. No bill would have been passed for the reorganization of the army, if we had not had on our statute books a law compelling the national militia, when called into the service of the United States, to be organized and officered

in the manner provided for the regular army. When the leading guardsmen learned of this law, they favored a reorganization bill. The guard organization was infinitely better than that prescribed for the regulars. But, as they were anxious to retain all the frills and furbelows of the guard organization, the bill had to provide for taking them in as organizations. War had been declared and the necessities of the Government were so urgent that this provision was accepted. It has cost the Government many millions of dollars, but it has also caused a general desire throughout the country for a uniform organization, and this will finally result in good.

The experience of the late war has shown the bad effects of drawing from civil life an army for immediate service. The placing of raw recruits in large camps resulted, as it always does, in sickness and discontent. An American is restive under restraint, and reckless in his violation of all rules of health. The American volunteer in the late war had the same characteristics as those of us who served in the Civil War—impatience of restraint and carelessness as to diet. If the Civil War had only lasted six months we would have had the same experience. It takes time to make a soldier. Given the best material in the world, it takes at least six months to develop the raw recruit into the reliable soldier. That is the reason why some of us wanted a regular army to take the first fighting line. The volunteers would thus have time to harden into a capacity to endure fatigue and gain the habit of obedience, which makes an army an effective fighting machine.

My attention was first called to this subject by reading the reports of the generals in command of the army at different times, and the urgent requests of every Secretary of War for the last thirty years for some legislation. The Franco-Prussian War conclusively proved that nations could not go to war on old lines, with old organizations. The time for leisurely fighting, when four to seven years might be spent in determining which was the victor, was passed forever. A conflict between nations must be sharp and decisive, frequently decided by one great battle. The terribly destructive weapons used put an end to protracted fighting. The old close order formation gave way to what is known as open order. Instead of touching elbows in line, men are now three feet apart, so as to reduce the danger as far as possible in

action. This places more men in the support, and fewer on the firing line. It necessitates a smaller unit than a ten company regiment, and at the same time makes a larger number in a company efficient. Grant, Sherman and Sheridan urged a reorganization of the army, and pointed out the danger to the United States of adhering to our old organization. Finally, a commission was appointed to examine into the subject and report to the War Department and through that to Congress. Sherman, then commanding the army, had made a full investigation of modern organization, and submitted the following:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.

Washington, D. C., September, 1876.

Sir: In compliance with the resolution adopted by the commission at its first session, August, 1876, I have the honor to submit my individual views and opinions of the matter confided to our action.

Each regiment would * * * contain, for a peace establishment, 54 officers and 736 enlisted men, aggregating 790; or the
 5 regiments artillery equal 60 companies equal 270 officers and 3,680 men.
 10 regiments of cavalry equal 120 companies equal 540 officers and 7,360 men.
 20 regiments of infantry equal 240 companies equal 1,080 officers and 14,720 men.

1,890 25,760

Aggregating, officers and men, 27,650.

To increase to the war standard, simply add to each company 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and 50 privates, which would result as follows:

5 regiments of artillery equal 60 companies equal 270 officers and 6,800 men.
 10 regiments of cavalry equal 120 companies equal 540 officers and 13,600 men.
 20 regiments of infantry equal 240 companies equal 1,080 officers and 27,200 men.

1,890 47,600

To further increase for war purposes, add four new companies to each battalion, and we have—

5 regiments of artillery equal 120 companies equal 510 officers and 13,700 men.
 10 regiments cavalry equal 240 companies equal 1,020 officers and 27,400 men.
 20 regiments infantry equal 480 companies equal 2,040 officers and 54,800 men.

3,570 95,900

The Germans now use companies as large as 250 men, so that a battalion of eight companies numbers 2,000 men. Assuming that as the maximum, we will have—

5 regiments equal 15 battalions of artillery, equal..... 30,000
 10 regiments equal 30 battalions of cavalry, equal..... 60,000
 20 regiments equal 60 battalions of infantry, equal..... 120,000

Making an army of..... 210,000

on a minimum or peace basis of 27,650. Thus an effective and well-organized army of over 200,000 can be created promptly "without the least confusion or disorder," fulfilling all the conditions of Mr. Calhoun's second great principle, which he regarded as of more national importance than the first.

On considering any paper organization it is safe to assume that about one-third are usually absent. This seems a large proportion, but it is the result of experience extending back for centuries. Good discipline and good administration diminish this ratio, while bad discipline and worse administration increase it largely. The usual causes of diminished ranks are wounds and sickness, furloughs and leaves of absence, confinement by way of punishment, details for cooking, for care of sick, as teamsters, care and distribution of supplies, detachments for escorts of trains and exposed points along the routes of supply, etc.

* * * * *
 With great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, General.

Hon. J. D. CAMERON,
 Secretary of War, and President of the Commission for the
 Reorganization, etc., of the Army.

I became thoroughly imbued with the idea that we could not afford to longer delay army legislation. I was startled at the indifference to the urgent solicitations of all our great commanders and resolved to bring the matter before Congress. Up to the time of the convening of the Fifty-fifth Congress, the War Department had contented itself with recommending suitable legislation to Congress, and Congress had utterly ignored all such recommendations. Both were to blame, but much the greater share must be laid on Congressional shoulders. When I resolved to take up this subject actively, I found cordial co-operation in the War Department. The present accomplished Adjutant-General of the army aided in every possible way and furnished me with valuable information.

Encouraged by this hearty co-operation, I formulated the first bill on the lines suggested by General Sherman. It made the peace establishment only about 30,000 men, gave the three battalion formation in time of war, with only two majors. In time of peace, a regiment was to be composed of only two battalions. The third battalion was to be mustered out by discharging two companies absolutely and skeletonizing the other two. It was a compromise measure, but an immense advance on anything before proposed. It could not pass. Moderate in all its provisions, it cut down the number of officers, and aroused the antagonism of every man who hoped for a commission. The size of the company was especially obnoxious. To demonstrate that the proposed army organization was in line with experience in other countries, I showed that the proposed provision was below rather than above what is required, as to number of enlisted men in a company, by nations where the military arm is of supreme importance.

The bill provided that the President might recruit a company up to two hundred and fifty, but that, when a company reached one hundred and fifty, it was at its war strength and could be fully officered by the addition of one second lieutenant and mounting the captain. On this basis the regiment would consist of eighteen hundred men and fifty-eight officers. This was war strength. The bill made no changes in the peace establishment, except the addition of twenty-five majors for the infantry. In Austria, a regiment in time of peace consists of eighty-two officers and two thousand four hundred and sixty-

six enlisted men. In France, on a peace basis, a regiment numbers sixty-seven officers and sixteen hundred and twelve enlisted men; on a war basis a regiment is composed of sixty-eight officers and three thousand one hundred and twenty enlisted men. In Germany, the strength of a regiment on a peace basis is sixty-five officers and two thousand and twenty enlisted men, while its war strength is seventy-nine officers and three thousand one hundred and forty-nine enlisted men. In Russia the strength of a regiment on a peace or war basis is seventy-seven officers and eighteen hundred and ninety-nine men. Austria and Russia have no expansion from within in time of war. Their regiments are of the same strength in peace or war. Both keep large standing armies, and increase their war strength by the addition of new regiments.

As said in the beginning of this article, we do not need a large regular army in time of peace. So, while providing for a very slight increase in the size of the army, simply to make possible the battalion organization for the peace footing, I made provision for a material increase of the war footing by expanding the regiment from less than one thousand men to eighteen hundred men, and a possible three thousand men, in the discretion of the President. In this I followed, in a modified form, the organization of the German and French armies. There is very little difference between these two countries in respect to regimental army organization. Both have the three battalions of four companies each. Germany, on a peace footing, has two more commissioned officers and five hundred and ninety-two more men to the regiment than France, but, on a war basis, France has eleven more commissioned officers and twenty-nine more enlisted men to a regiment than Germany. They are both great military nations—armed camps, in fact. Both eagerly and promptly adopt every improvement in military organization, and seek in every way so to organize their armies as to make them the most effective fighting machines. Austria and Russia are equally alert to find out and adopt the best methods of military organization, and have large reserves organized into regiments which are ready to be called into service on a day's notice. They depend on these reserve regiments rather than on expanding from within. Germany and France do both.

In the United States, we have not the reserve to draw on.

So far as the national guard is concerned, there are almost as many organizations as there are States. There is no uniformity, and therefore no good can come to the country from that organization, as at present constituted. It is purely the creation of State laws to meet the wants of the State. In Pennsylvania, New York, Illinois, Iowa and other States having a well-organized guard, it answers admirably as a supplement to the police force of the State, but that is all. In the late war, I think I am safe in saying that not twenty-five per cent. of the enlisted force of the guard enlisted as volunteers. This result follows as a natural sequence to the character of men composing the national guard. It is made up largely of men who can leave their business for a few days, but who cannot leave for one or two years. When the guard wanted to go into the late war as organizations, a large number very properly withdrew, and left only skeletons of companies, which were filled up with raw recruits before being mustered into the service of the United States. They were not well drilled and equipped organizations. In no sense would they compare with the reserve organizations of the military powers of Europe. Our experience in the late war demonstrated that the only trained soldiers the country could rely on were those of the regular force. Spain, fortunately for us, had no military strength, and so we were not punished for our long neglect of ordinary requirements of all rules of organization. Even little Switzerland has a superior organization, consisting of three battalions of four companies each, with eighty-one officers and two thousand two hundred and sixty-two enlisted men for each regiment. I was foolish enough to believe that Congress would pass our first bill. It did not add a single regiment or company to the army on a peace basis, but provided for expanding the army "in time of war or after war had been declared by Congress," to comply with the requirements of the modern science of war. The bill was unanimously reported from the Committee on Military Affairs. When it was brought up on the floor, the storm broke and ignorance and prejudice held high carnival. The bill was overwhelmingly defeated by sheer force of the lung power of members who have since confessed that they knew nothing of the subject.

When the third session of the Fifty-fifth Congress convened, every one recognized that some army legislation must be had.

The law enacted after war was declared provided that, when peace should be proclaimed, the regular army should be immediately reduced to a force not greater than twenty-six thousand six hundred and ten enlisted men, and the volunteers, all admitted, should be mustered out at the earliest day possible. The American volunteer enlists to fight, and becomes very restive when compelled to perform garrison duty. Members of Congress were being importuned to secure the discharge of the volunteers, and a condition of utter demoralization would ensue if any attempt were made to keep them in the service.

Facing this situation, I came to Washington before Congress convened, and, after full conference with the War Department, the outlines of a bill were agreed upon. It increased the number of infantry regiments from twenty-five to thirty, the cavalry from ten to twelve, abolished the regimental organizations of heavy artillery, and created a corps of artillery. It left the cavalry organization as we have had it for the last thirty years, and as all other nations organize this branch of the service. It increased the infantry company to one hundred and forty-five enlisted men, as a maximum, and provided about twenty thousand men for the artillery arm of the service, only two regiments to be organized as field artillery. The necessity of caring for the coast-defense batteries made the increase of the men for heavy artillery absolutely essential. The general of the army in his testimony before the Committee on Military Affairs, December 12, 1898, said:

"The increase of the fortifications and the great importance of fortifying the coast makes the necessity for a large increase of the personnel of the artillery apparent to everyone. We have now batteries and fortifications under construction, which will be completed this year, requiring 195 batteries of artillery to take care of the enormously expensive guns, mortars, fortifications, magazines, ammunition, and everything of that kind. When the entire system is completed it will require 362 batteries for the coast of the United States."

The House bill did not provide for as many men in the artillery as every expert said would be necessary. We thought men could be arranged in smaller squads and thus care for the guns, although we did believe there should be a large increase in this arm of the service. The force of artillery authorized at the breaking out of the war with Spain was seven regiments of about eight hundred men each, making about five thousand six hun-

dred enlisted men in the artillery. The Congress had already expended nearly sixty millions of dollars in coast defenses and had neglected to provide men to care for the guns. To go on expending vast sums to protect our coast cities and make no provisions for manning the batteries, seemed to me to be criminal negligence. You cannot make a modern artilleryman in a day or a month. In the Civil War, with our old muzzle-loading guns, the problem was simple, and a raw recruit soon learned all there was of it. But the coast defense disappearing gun is quite a different affair. It requires skilled men to operate a battery. The range-finder, electrician and even the men who handle the powder and shells must be thoroughly trained, to be of any use. We tried to show that it was cheaper to man the guns than to go on with an inadequate force. In the report to the House, I used these words:

"It is pertinent, however, to remark that according to reliable observation the deterioration of electric machinery in our coast forts when uncared for is 33 per cent. per annum, of other machinery 20 per cent. and of guns and carriages 25 per cent. A battery of two 12-inch guns complete with all its machinery costs \$146,000; if uncared for the yearly loss would be about \$44,000.

"In view of these facts, the fact can not be challenged that the recommendations of this bill touching the artillery arm are not excessive."

In the infantry arm, the only contest in the committee was as to the size of the company. One or two members interested in national guard organizations wanted a small company, but the committee was strongly impressed with the fact that the company could be made as large as one hundred and forty-five enlisted men and preserve the highest efficiency. So far as economy was involved, there was no contention that such a company would not be more economical than a smaller company.

General Miles, when before the committee in April, 1898, urged that a company be not less than one hundred and twenty-two enlisted men. He modified this in his testimony, December 12, 1898.

General Schofield, in his testimony before the committee, said on this point:

"I would say, though, in connection with the strength of the army, that it would seem to be wise to make the necessary increase by adding as few regiments as practicable and getting the necessary strength by giving very large size if necessary to the companies, making the enlisted strength very large in proportion to the number of officers; so, if the time comes, as I hope it may in a very few years, when a considerable reduction can be made

in the force now presumed to be necessary, that it can be done without any injury to the military effectiveness, by simply discharging unnecessary enlisted men, still leaving an efficient organization of 50 or 80 or 100 men to the company.

"I would not hesitate, with that in view to make the companies as large as 150 men, and I know from my own experience that with such officers as are now found in the regular army a company of 150 men can be made more effective than any new troops under new officers could be made in a short time; although troops organized as our volunteers generally are, of the character generally found among them, would become as good as regulars in the course of a few years; but for a long time a company of volunteers would be less efficient than a company of 150 men organized under such men as now exist in the army."

The greatest trouble we found in the late war was in the staff. Congress had been for years gradually cutting down the staff, until we did not have enough trained officers to care for any increase in the army. All at once our army was expanded from 26,610 to 260,000 men. This required an immense increase of every staff department. The new officers had to be taken largely from civil life. The regular army was short of officers—many companies having been reduced by detail or staff assignment to one commissioned officer to the company. This great mass of raw material could not be made effective all at once. A man without training could not make a good quartermaster or commissary in a week. The regular force worked day and night to supply the army and educate the new men. But when men and officers are both inexperienced, trouble may be looked for. This was the case in nearly every brigade in the army.

The bill, to correct this evil, made substantial increase in every staff department, and especially in the quartermaster and commissary divisions. After seven days' debate and contention in the House, the bill passed on the lines laid down by the Committee on Military Affairs. If the Senate had adopted it as it passed the House, and as it was reported by Republican members of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, we would have had a splendid modern organization, providing for an army in time of peace of about fifty-one thousand men, divided into different arms of the service as follows: Infantry, about 23,000 enlisted men; cavalry, 9,000 enlisted men, and artillery about 19,000 enlisted men. Does any sane man regard this as a large standing army for a nation of 75,000,000 people?

On a peace basis, France has 1,000 soldiers to 62,589 of population; Germany 1,000 to 89,300 of population; England, most

favoured of all the nations of the old-world, 1,000 to 232,959 of population, while this bill would have given only 1,000 soldiers to 1,477,000 of our population.

The bill gave the President discretionary power between the minimum of 51,000 enlisted men and a maximum of 96,000 enlisted men. This larger number embraced all arms of the service, including a regiment of engineers, the hospital and signal corps. It gave a small fighting line and the volunteers could be organized and equipped to come in as reserve, or second line, without the confusion and suffering experienced during the past year. The relative size of the army on a war strength shows how moderate an increase was permitted.

France in war has 1,000 soldiers to 15,407 inhabitants; Germany in war has 1,000 soldiers to 17,427 inhabitants; Great Britain in war has 1,000 soldiers to 72,413 inhabitants, while under the House bill, the United States provided for only 1,000 soldiers to about 791,000 inhabitants. Of course this does not take into account the volunteer. The bill dealt only with the regular establishment, and the above is simply intended to show how moderate was the measure. The fighting strength of this nation will equal that of any other nation on earth, but it is not available without organization.

In the Senate Committee an unfortunate situation developed. It stood five Republicans for the House bill and five Democrats against it. No action could be taken. The 4th of March, when the Fifty-fifth Congress must adjourn *sine die*, was near. Finally, an agreement was reached by which the Republicans reported what is known as the "Hull bill" and the Democrats reported what is known as the "Cockrell bill." The chairman of the Senate Committee, in his report on the Hull bill, gave cordial endorsement to the measure, saying, among other things:

"Assuming, for illustration, that the Government will require about 100,000 troops for defense of the frontier, for coast defense, and to maintain our authority in the islands for whose good order and government this nation is responsible, together with a reasonable reserve force, the committee believe the organization provided for in this bill will make the most efficient military organization, at the lowest cost to the taxpayers, of any proposed."

* * * * *

"The organization of the artillery provided for in the bill changes it from the regimental formation to that of a corps of artillery. Let it be borne in mind how complicated is the artillery service, how many different

kinds of guns it has to serve; that in future it will be charged with the torpedo service, and that the nature of artillery service in general will depend entirely upon local conditions—conditions that differ from harbor to harbor—and it is at once evident that an arbitrary division of the personnel into regiments is inherently vicious. The corps system, on the other hand, gives the artillery the adaptability and flexibility that are demanded by the ever-varying conditions of its service.”

The bill was taken up in the Senate and, if it could have been brought to a vote, would have passed by a decisive majority. The Republican members of the committee for two days presented an unbroken front, but found the small minority determined to talk the session out rather than permit a vote on the bill. Senators, not members of the Committee on Military Affairs, started a compromise. Senator Cockrell, representing the minority, submitted what he was willing to support, and, after conference with the executive officers of the Government, the Senate Military Committee unanimously reported the Senate bill. The minority would not agree to the consideration of the House bill, as that would throw the difference between the two houses into conference, and would result in their defeat. The majority of the Senate were compelled to yield. The compromise bill, as reported to the Senate, was a good measure so far as the organization of the infantry and cavalry is concerned. It was practically the Hull bill, except that it fixed a minimum of enlisted men in a company, and left out all relating to the maximum number. It left the number of regiments of infantry and cavalry the same as provided for in existing law, but in the artillery it adhered to the old fiction of a regimental organization, and added two batteries to each regiment of artillery. It made no change in the regular staff, but continued a certain number of the volunteer staff until July 1st, 1901. It fixed the maximum for the army at 65,000 enlisted men, and authorized the enlistment of 35,000 volunteers to be organized into thirty regiments to serve until July 1st, 1901. The President had full power to appoint all officers of the volunteers, so that the State officers had no authority in the premises. The bill authorized a larger force than the House bill for immediate service, and after 1901 left a good line organization for the army and a permanent force of about 39,000 men. If it had passed the Senate as reported very little objection could have been urged against it, except the provisions as to the staff. When it was first considered in

the Senate, Senator Hawley, for the Republicans, cordially indorsed the measure and Senator Cockrell declared: "In the sight of God and man, this is a just bill." With both parties for it, one would have thought the measure would have easy sailing. But Senator Gorman was not satisfied, and, with the aid of a few Democrats and Populists, he insisted on amendments which entirely changed the character of the bill and made it an inconsistent and contradictory measure.

The provision that a company should not consist of less than a certain number was stricken out, and the small minimum was written into law as the maximum. So we have, as a maximum of a cavalry company, forty-three privates, twenty-two non-commissioned officers, cooks, farriers and musicians, and three commissioned officers.

An infantry company has forty-eight privates, seventeen non-commissioned officers, including cooks and musicians, and three commissioned officers. This is the war strength. Regiments organized with such companies would be too absurd for China to adopt. The bill gives to each regiment a full band, and to each company two musicians. With respectably organized regiments, this would be all right; but with no men to speak of on the fighting line, it suggests the idea that this Government hereafter will make war with wind and attempt to gain victories with noise.

Section 12 of the bill gives the President the right to raise a regular army of 65,000 men. The bill fixes the number of regiments, the number of companies in a regiment, and the exact number of men in a company. On this basis the army would be 39,000. No one contends that the President can increase the number of regiments, or companies; and the law officers of the Government disagree as to his power to increase the size of the company. The two provisions contradict each other. In fixing the regimental organization it provides for the three battalion plan, but the Gorman proviso says: "That each and every provision of this act shall continue in force until July 1st, 1901; and on and after that date all the general staff and line officers appointed to the army under this act shall be discharged, and the numbers restored in each grade to those existing at the passage of this act." This absolutely destroys the three battalion organization.

The act creates additional officers for each infantry regiment as follows: One major, two captains, four first lieutenants. These are all "officers created by this act." No regular army officers will want such places, as without further legislation by Congress their acceptance of a commission would mean retirement to private life two years from July next. The bill was amended at the will of any individual Senator. It is, in its finished state, the worst kind of patchwork. No greater exhibition of the power of a Senator was ever given. A very small minority of the Senate, led by one experienced Senator, took the Senate, the House, and the Executive Department of the Government by the throat and compelled the acceptance of a measure which does not meet the approval of any man familiar with the subject.

It was not alone the fear of an extra session which compelled the acceptance of this act. If Congress had been called in extra session by the 15th of March, who could tell when a law would be passed? The House could act promptly, and in a week send the measure to the Senate. Under the Senate rules there was no certainty that it could pass that body before June. In the meantime, peace declared, the regular army would have been reduced to 26,000, the volunteers discharged, the Executive powerless and the nation disgraced. We chose the lesser of the evils. But I hope the fight will cause the country to demand a change in the Senate rules, so that a majority may have the power, as it now has the right, to legislate.

JOHN A. T. HULL.